Approved For Release 2002/06/14 : CIA-RDP70B00501R000100040038-0 Executive Regulary

21 April 1967 Jun 101 formal

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary Vance, 20 April 1967

- 1. I called on Mr. Vance in his office at 1600 hours, Pharse ay, 20 April and delivered Mr. Heims' letter of 19 April concerning the disposition of the "20 Questions" and the construction of a target oriented display of intelligence resources. I told Mr. Vance that Mr. Helms wanted to be completely clear about his attitude toward the target oriented display and for this reason asked me to deliver his letter personally to Mr. Vance so that I could answer any questions which might occur to him. Mr. Vance read the letter through and said that he agreed with it. I said that we recognize that the believe Department had to take the initiative in the construction of the dealga of the display of Defense Department resources. Obviously the data to be assembled has to come from programs which are aurmally compiled in three separate presentations. The development of a consolidated presentation inevitably involves cutting through established procedural and jurisdictional lines of authority. This can only be done under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. I pointed out, however, that the DCI has two basic and non-delegable responsibilities in this exercise. One is the statutory responsibility for the protection of sources and methods. The other is his responsibility for determining the objectives of the national intelligence effort. I said that this latter responsibility was obviously not exclusive. On the other hand, it seemed to me that he has the paramount responsibility for targetting intelligence activities.
 - 2. Mr. Vance said that he was in complete agreement with these views. He did not seem to me overenthusiastic about this exercise or particularly optimistic that it would serve a particularly

useful purpose. At least he thought it would be a long time before
anything significant came out of it. I teld him that we would deal
with Solia Horwitz on matters of policy and that I would assign some
person or persons to ceal directly with Herb Bengington on matters
relating to the construction of the display. (I have subsequently advised
Horwitz, Bengington and Bill Fischer of the Boll that
and would represent the DCI in this capacity.)
and mount represent toe right fitting capacity.
3. I said that I shared Mr. Vance's skepticism and that,
while I believe that we should push for the target oriented display as
vigorously as circumstances permit, we should simultaneously undertake
to review an evaluation of particular areas which, because of their
expense and/or importance, appear to warrant special examination.
I pointed out that the purpose of a display is to reveal imbalances
in the total program effort or areas of overlap, etc. A good many of
these are pretty obvious already and, in my opinion, should be the
subject of immediate examination. It was for this reason, I said.
that we had put forward the "20 Chestions." I also said that I had
had several conversations with General Carrell about the necessity
for studies of discrete areas of intelligence activity, such as the effort
against the Soviet ICBM program, etc. Mr. Vance agreed that we
should go ahead with this kind of thing.
4. Mr. Vance said that he had just received the
from Al Flan and wondered whether I had read it. I said that I had not
and that I was concerned about the ABM problem as a test of the ability
of the intelligence community to launch a concerted and efficient effort
against a really important target. I said I hoped that this problem
might indeed serve as a catalyst to help improve the organizational
arrangements in the community to plan and program the activity against
this kind of target. The I said, was concerned with 25X
only one element of the problem, although a very important one, and
that was the overhead coverage. Mr. Vance said that he had instructed
Flax and to brief him on the tetality of the effort and the relative
effectiveness of land based, as well as space, coverage. I said that
I housed he would include up in any discussions of this character. The

25X1D

25X1A

25X1A

and means of coverage most likely to be preductive.

real problem seemed to me to identify the specific targets which were accessible to various types of collection activity and identify the targets

	25X1I
	hought the program review procedures now
	gards CIA, the CCP and the CIP, were working about as far as they could go. I doubted
whether any substantial	improvement in the procedures relating to
	bis. I expressed some reservation about the ed out that the NRP is not given anything like
	which other large intelligence programs are
The state of the s	was obviously important to maintain to some
	with which reconsaissance programs are dis- on the other hand, I thought that the program
	mewhat more normal review. Mr. Vance agreed.
A Finally Ma	Vance reverted to his conversation with the
Director and Admiral To	aylor about the need for a very searching and 25X
ritical review of our gr	round based intelligence facilities. This is
point stressed by the S	HECTETARY OF L'STEASE.
	We discussed the problem posed by the
	unds for tactical and early warning intelligence r. Vance that we had already undertaken a review
of the take and objective	s of overseas collection facilities and would
JA .	as about the purposes and importance of these
ictivities am: me cost as	nd relative effectiveness of alternatives.
	157 7.1 2
	John A. Bross
Distribution:	D/DCI/NIPE
DDCI	
ExDir-Comptroller	APR 22 8 41 AM "67
DD/S&T	t → 27 S AM +F →
OPR	

25X1C

25X1¢

25X1A